Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality
Sarah H. Cleveland
Columbia Law School, scleve@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 8 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3249

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

Commentary on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum
The Kiobel Presumption and
Extraterritoriality
SARAH H. CLEVELAND*

With its modem rebirth in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,1the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) held out a potentially transformative promise. By
establishing a forum in the United States for a victim of torture that
had occurred at the hands of a Paraguayan police inspector in Paraguay, the ATS offered to emancipate the state-centered Westphalian
system from a narrow focus on territorial sovereignty, and move toward a more globalized community focused on the protection of universal values. The ATS recognized that modem human rights perpetrators, victims, and violations move easily across borders, and that
transnational accountability for such violations is in the common interest of all humanity. "The torturer," as the inaugural opinion in
Filartigaput it, "has become-like the pirate and slave trader before
him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." 2
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum3 dashed that broadest utopian vision. In asserting
that causes of action under the ATS are limited by the domestic law
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes, Chief Justice John Roberts appeared to firmly reassert a highly traditionalist
view of the integrity of sovereign territorial states. It was also a vi*

Louis Henkin Professor of Human and Constitutional Rights, Columbia Law
School. From 2009 to 2011, she served as the Counselor on International Law to the Legal
Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed here are her own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United States. The author would like to thank William
Dodge, Francesco Francioni, Harold Hongju Koh, Henry Monaghan, David Pozen, and the
editors of the ColumbiaJournal of TransnationalLaw.
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 890.
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
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sion that isolated the United States in the international system since,
despite extensive briefing of international law issues, the opinion
rested entirely on principles of U.S. domestic statutory interpretation.
Ironically, the case arose from the activities of a multinational corporate conglomerate-Royal Dutch Petroleum, a company domiciled in
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but with a global reach, including the Nigerian activities at issue in Kiobel.
The Chief Justice's attempt to trim the ATS's twenty-first
century transnationalist sails with seventeenth-century concepts of
sovereignty and territoriality, however, was not as sweeping as may
first appear. For a variety of reasons, the presumption articulated by
the Court is not a traditional presumption against extraterritoriality.
Instead, it is a presumption for the ATS only-a "Kiobel presumption"-whose broad parameters may have less to do with "territory," and may preserve more of the transformational vision of the
ATS than appears at first glance. The reading of this presumption
that best reconciles the opinions in the case, the history and purpose
of the ATS, and the interests of the United States, would recognize
that extraterritorial claims that "touch and concern" the United
States sufficiently to displace the Kiobel presumption can and should
include claims involving perpetrators who are U.S. nationals or domiciled in the United States, and other suits implicating important U.S.
national interests, including piracy and the United States' important
interest in denying safe haven. Ultimately, the nature of the presumption that the Court applied and its rebuttal by claims that "touch
and concern" the United States should allow for a range of ATS
claims to continue to be brought, including suits like Filartiga.
I. THE KIOBEL PRESUMPTION

The most important part of the majority opinion in Kiobel is
the final paragraph. Until that paragraph, the opinion suggests the
Court is adopting a categorical prohibition on adjudication of ATS
claims arising in a foreign country. That is, ATS claims abroad could
not be adjudicated, whether or not the violations at issue were committed by U.S. persons or were subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, whether the foreign state consented or objected to the suit,
or whether the litigation otherwise provoked friction with foreign
states. The penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion, after all,
states:
We therefore conclude that the presumption against
territoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.
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"[T]here is no clear indication of extraterritoriality
here," Morrison, 561 U.S. at __, and petitioner's
case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the United States is barred. 4
But this apparently unqualified assertion is followed immediately by the final paragraph, which, when read together with the separate concurrences, suggests the Court is actually deciding much less.
The Chief Justice writes:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it
would reach too
far to say that mere corporate pres5
ence suffices.
This passage immediately raises a number of interpretive
questions, including regarding how constraining the limitation of the
holding is to "these facts." The Solicitor General had urged dismissal in a holding limited to circumstances like those in Kiobel.6 Strictly applied, such a position could limit the judgment in Kiobel to cases
involving acts of a foreign corporation, alleged to have aided and
abetted violations by a foreign sovereign, committed within the sovereign's own territory, against its own nationals, and with no connection to the United States other than the plaintiffs' residence and the
defendant's "mere corporate presence."
The Chief Justice's final paragraph, however, appears to want
to establish a broader rule based on the relationship between the
claims and the U.S. forum, such that ATS "claims" must "touch and
concern" "the territory" of the United States sufficiently to rebut a
presumption against extraterritoriality. But even this rule leaves open
a number of questions regarding what must touch and concern the
United States, how substantial the relationship must be, and whether
the requisite contact is with U.S. "territory," a U.S. interest, or something broader.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 1669 (alteration in original).
Id.
Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of

Affirmance at 5, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus II]. See

also id. at 13 ("In this case, foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign corporate defendants for
aiding and abetting a foreign sovereign's treatment of its own citizens in its own territory,
without any connection to the United States beyond the residence of the named plaintiffs...
and the corporate defendants' presence .... ").
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From the majority holding, we know two things: that "mere
corporate presence" of a foreign corporation in the United States is
not enough to rebut the presumption and that the Kiobel plaintiffs'
status as political asylees and legal residents 7 was insufficient to rebut the presumption. Most other issues remain subject to further judicial development and interpretation.
Much ink doubtless will be spilled by academics and litigants
in trying to divine the meaning of the Chief Justice's final paragraph,
in light of Justice Kennedy's equally opaque one-paragraph concurrence. My primary purpose here, however, is to focus on a different
aspect of the majority opinion-the character of the "presumption
against extraterritoriality" that the Court articulates in this case, and
how that presumption should be understood in light of the various
opinions and the somewhat unique context of the ATS.
The Court gives much lip service to classic articulations of
the presumption against extraterritoriality. It quotes the leading Morrison opinion for the proposition that "[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." 8 It notes
that the function of the presumption is "to protect against unintended
clashes" between U.S. and foreign law and to avoid "international
discord," and emphasizes "[t]he danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy." 9 After holding that the
presumption applies to the ATS, the Court further concludes that the
presumption is not rebutted by any "clear indication" of extraterritorial application in the text or history of the ATS. 10
The majority opinion, however, repeatedly makes clear that
the Court is not, in fact, directly applying the classical canon against
extraterritorial application of statutes to the ATS. Instead, it is applying "principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality," and adapting these to the peculiar features of the ATS as part of
the courts' common law-making authority. This was also the position of the United States, which argued as amicus that the presumption against extraterritoriality is "not directly applicable to the fashioning of federal common law," and thus the ATS, but that "the
underlying principles counsel similar restraint in the judicial lawmak-

7. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
8. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2878 (2010)).
9. Id. (citation omitted).
10. Although Justice Breyer's concurrence is persuasive in demonstrating that the
ATS does clearly evidence an intent to apply extraterritorially, that issue is not my focus.
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ing endeavor." "1
A. JurisdictionalStatute
The Court makes this point clear in at least two ways. First,
under the Court's precedents, including Morrison, the presumption
against extraterritoriality has traditionally applied to substantive and
not jurisdictional statutes-i.e., to statutes "regulating conduct."
The Court acknowledges this, and quotes Morrison for the proposition that "the question of extraterritorial application was a 'merits
question,' not a question of jurisdiction." 12 The Court also concedes
that the ATS is "strictly jurisdictional." 13 Sosa held that the ATS
was a jurisdictional statute, enacted with the expectation that the
common law would provide a cause of action through judicial law
development. 14 As the Chief Justice writes, the statute "does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief," but "instead allows federal
courts to recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law." 15
Applying the classical canon against extraterritorial application of statutes to a purely jurisdictional provision would radically
expand that canon into uncharted waters-a course which, if taken,
would seem to warrant greater discussion by the Court. However,
the Court does not purport to extend the application of the presumption against territoriality to jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (federal question jurisdiction) or § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). 16 Instead, it concludes that "we think the principles underlying
the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering
causes of action that may be brought under the ATS." ' 7 This statement appears to recognize that the Court is adopting a position akin
to that of the United States government in this respect-i.e., that the
presumption does not technically apply to the ATS because it is a
"strictly jurisdictional" statute, but that "principles underlying" the
presumption should inform a court's crafting of the cause of action as
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

U.S. Amicus II, supra note 6, at 3.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
Id. at 1664 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).
Id. at 1663.
Id. at 1664.

16.

See William S.

Dodge,

The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality After

Morrison, 105 Am.Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 396, 399 n.33 (2011) (stating that application of the
presumption to jurisdictional statutes "would be contrary to common practice").
17.

Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664 (emphasis added).
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a matter of judicial common law-making authority under the ATS.
The Court closes the discussion of the presumption by reiterating that
"[t]he principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS." 18
B. Application on the High Seas
Second, this reading is further confirmed by the question presented and the Court's analysis of the text, history, and purposes of
the ATS. In that analysis, the Court recognizes that the ATS was understood to apply to piracy and other conduct on the high seas.
The question that the Court asked the litigants to address was
not a classic question about extraterritoriality. The Court did not ask
whether the ATS could be understood to address activity outside the
United States, but "whether and under what circumstances courts
may recognize a cause of action under the [ATS], for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States." 19
The presumption against extraterritoriality has generally
meant that statutes do not apply beyond U.S. territory-whether on
the high seas or in a foreign country. The Court concedes this point,
citing Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,20 and Amerada Hess,21 for the
proposition that "[t]his Court has generally treated the high seas the
same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application." 22 Sale addressed whether a U.S. immigration
statute applied to Haitian migrants interdicted on the high seas, and
the Court applied the presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes to conclude that it did not. Amerada Hess likewise
held that a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did
23
not apply to the high seas.
The Kiobel majority, however, acknowledges that the ATS
was originally understood to apply to acts of piracy,2 4 and that
"[p]iracy typically occurs on the high seas." ' 25 The majority also
18.

Id. at 1665 (emphasis added).

19.

Id. at 1662.

20.
21.:
22.
23.
24.

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993).
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723-24

(2004)).
25.

Id. at 1667.
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recognizes that the ATS was understood to apply to acts on the high
seas other than piracy. The 1795 opinion of Attorney General Bradford clearly viewed the ATS as applying to the conduct of U.S. nationals on the high seas who collaborated in a French attack on a
British settlement in Sierra Leone. The only interpretive question the
Court raises is whether Bradford's opinion also viewed the ATS as
26
applying in the foreign territory.
The Court explains away the historical application of the ATS
on the high seas by noting that claims adjudicating an act of piracy
do not "overcome the presumption against application to conduct in
the territory of another sovereign," 27 and that the Bradford opinion
"hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption" in that context. 28 This may distinguish the historical evidence for purposes of the question at issue in Kiobel, which involved
only application of the ATS to foreign soil.29 But the acknowledged
applications to the high seas are uncomfortable for reconciling the
statute with the traditional presumption against extraterritoriality.
A judgment that altered the traditional canon against extraterritoriality so as to allow U.S. statutes falling within the presumption
to reach conduct on the high seas would radically extend the presumption against extraterritoriality. As the D.C. Circuit recently observed, a presumption that statutes apply on the high seas but do not
apply in foreign countries would be "a novel canon of statutory construction, and not one of the settled 'background canons of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware' when it legislates." 30
It would suggest, among other things, that the holdings in Sale and
Amerada Hess were incorrect. No member of the Kiobel Court,
however, suggested that the majority was engaged in such an expansion of the canon.
This fact, together with the limited scope of the question presented and the application of the canon to a jurisdictional statute,
confirms that the Court did not hold that the traditional canon against
extraterritorial application of statutes itself applied to the ATS. In26. Id. at 1667-68.
27. Id. at 1666 (emphasis added). As Justice Breyer points out, however, an act of
piracy implicates the jurisdiction of another sovereign whenever piracy occurs on a vessel
under the flag of another state. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 1668.
29. Id. at 1668-69 (concluding that "[n]othing about this historical context suggests
that Congress also intended federal common law under the ATS to provide a cause of action
for conduct occurringin the territoryof another sovereign." (emphasis added)).

30. Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Lockhart v. United
States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005)).
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deed, these same considerations led the executive branch to conclude
in Kiobel that the canon against extraterritorial application of statutes
did not per se apply to the ATS. 3 1
C. InternationalLaw
Nor is the Kiobel Court's application of a presumption against
extraterritoriality in any way mandated by international law. Despite
extensive briefing of the exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed under international law, 32 the majority declined to confront the
international law implications of ATS jurisdiction. The closest the

31. The U.S. executive branch has taken various positions regarding extraterritorial
application of the ATS over time, but had only relatively recently invoked the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a limitation on the statute. As noted, in 1795 the Attorney
General understood the ATS as applying at least on the high seas, and likely also on the
territory that is now Sierra Leone. In 1980, the United States supported application of the
statute in Filartigato an act of torture committed in Paraguay against a Paraguayan national,
when both the perpetrator and survivors were later found in the United States. The United
States noted that "a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances"
could "seriously damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of
human rights." Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), at 22-23 (quoted in U.S. Amicus II, at 19).
In 1987, the United States argued that the ATS was limited to torts for which the United
States might be held responsible, not by the presumption against extraterritoriality. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989)
(No. 86-2448). In Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), the United States
supported claims of gross human rights violations committed by foreign nationals against
foreign nationals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only in its briefing in Sosa and thereafter did
the United States assert that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be understood
to bar claims under the ATS for the conduct of foreign persons in foreign countries. See,
e.g., Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46-50, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). In Kiobel, the United States again
backed away from this position and stated that "the government urges the Court not to adopt
such a categorical rule here." U.S. Amicus It, supra note 6, at 22 n. 11.
32. Some briefs before the Court invoked the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Lotus case for the proposition that absent any international law prohibition, a
state may impose the civil remedies it wishes. Other litigants contended that international
law prohibitions on prescriptive jurisdiction did not apply in the ATS context, because the
ATS prescribes overseas conduct based on substantive standards established by universally
applicable rules of international law, rather than under U.S. domestic law. Still others
maintained that the ATS is an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, and thus its exercise is
limited to circumstances in which international law allows the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, including nationality, passive personality, protective, and universal jurisdiction.
Finally, still others contended that international law does not recognize civil liability for
universal jurisdiction crimes and that ATS jurisdiction for that purpose accordingly was not
available.
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Court comes to addressing international law is to state that its concerns regarding conflicts with foreign states are not diminished by the
fact that claims can be brought under the ATS "only for alleged violations of international law norms that are 'specific, universal, and
obligatory."' 33 The Court points to the Torture Victim Protection
Act for the proposition that "identifying such a norm is only the beginning of defining a cause of action," and that other considerations,
such as the scope of liability, and rules of exhaustion and limitations,
all carry "significant foreign policy implications." 34 This suggests
that the Court was of the view that, regardless what extraterritorial
exercises of authority international law might allow, the ATS required further discipline and constraint. The U.S. domestic law presumption against extraterritoriality that the Court invoked instead is a
precautionary canon that presumes that Congress intends to legislate
more restrictively than international law requires.
Thus, despite the fact that the domestic law canon against extraterritoriality does not apply to the ATS itself, and that international
law did not compel this result, the Court concluded that the principles
underlying the canon against extraterritorial application of statutes
should be taken into account by judges in shaping the common law
cause of action under the ATS. Again, as the Court put it, "[t]he
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality...
35
constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS."
The distinction between the actual operation of the canon and
application of its underlying principles is critical. Mere application
of the canon's underlying principles liberates the presumption against
extraterritoriality from some of its strictures (including its nonapplication on the high seas and to jurisdictional statutes) without
disrupting established doctrines. The distinction further indicates
that the Court is applying principles underlying the canon, not as
mandated by either domestic or international law, but rather as a precautionary or prudential measure to avoid conflict with foreign states
in the exercise of ATS jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is these precautionary principles, rather than a rigid territorial prohibition, that
should inform and shape the application of the Kiobel presumption.
Finally, the Court's approach makes clear that in applying the principles underlying the canon, courts have common law authority to
shape and adapt those principles to accommodate the unique goals of
the ATS-just as the Kiobel majority demonstrated in adapting the

33.
34.
35.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
Id.
Id.
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principles to the ATS.
II. Two VIEWS OF STATUTORY PURPOSE

Oddly, in its consideration of the canon, the majority never
grapples with the underlying purposes of the ATS-purposes that are
also an awkward fit for a classical application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Although there is only limited historical
data directly evidencing the purpose of the ATS, over time, two
competing visions of the purpose of the ATS have developed. One
vision, which I call the "state responsibility" reading, views the central purpose of the statute as ensuring that U.S. nationals and persons
acting on behalf of the United States do not cause ha-iam to foreign nationals that cannot be remedied in U.S. courts. The primary function
of the ATS, under this vision, is to provide a damages remedy to foreign nationals who are injured by U.S. actors in a manner that is inconsistent with international law, in order to avoid escalation and adverse foreign relations consequences for the United States.
Advocates of this reading, including Professor Thomas Lee 36 and
Professors Bellia and Clark, 37 view the primary purpose of the ATS
as remedying conduct that could give rise to U.S. responsibility under
international law. They point to incidents such as the Marbois Affair
in Philadelphia, and the Blackstonian offenses of violations of safe
passage and assaults on ambassadors, as paradigmatic circumstances
that the ATS was designed to address.
The state responsibility interpretation of the ATS, however,
does not comfortably capture the third form of conduct that Blackstone considered to be an "offense against the law of nations" that
gave rise to individual liability-piracy. The Supreme Court has
now recognized that acts of piracy on the high seas could be remedied under the ATS in both Sosa and Kiobel. But few, if any, acts of
piracy could have been attributable to the United States, given rise to
a perception of state responsibility, or otherwise threatened U.S. relations with foreign states. The scourge of piracy involved a qualitatively different concern. Piracy, as the only form of individual conduct subject to universal jurisdiction in the late eighteenth century,
36. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 830 (2006).
37. Professors Bellia and Clark argue that "the ATS restricted suits to those against
U.S. citizens but allowed aliens to sue for any intentional tort involving force against their
person or personal property." Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 448 (2011).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[52:8

was conduct that was considered in the vital national interest of every
state-including the United States-to suppress. As Blackstone put
it, the pirate committed an "offense against the universal law of society," such that "every
community has a right.., to inflict.., pun38
him."
upon
ishment
Advocates of an alternative, more universalist, reading of the
ATS thus point to piracy, and the modem equivalents of piracy that
international law now subjects to universal jurisdiction, as evidence
that the ATS was intended to reach beyond state responsibility. Like
piracy, torture, war crimes, and genocide are examples of conduct
that is so universally condemned by international law that the law authorizes its punishment wherever the perpetrator is found, and which
it is in the national interest of the United States to punish, including
under the ATS.
The Kiobel majority does not meaningfully address either of
these underlying purposes of the ATS, and with good reason. Neither reading supports applying a presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS. Even the narrower state responsibility view of the
ATS is not consistent with territorially limiting liability to actions
within U.S. borders. As Justice Kagan observed in the second oral
argument, an assault by a U.S. national on a French ambassador in
London would implicate U.S. foreign relations interests no less than
an assault in Philadelphia. 39 Either would give rise to U.S. responsibility to punish the conduct. Both could severely harm U.S. foreign
relations if left unremedied. And in both cases, France would expect
the United States to remedy the violation.
A presumption that restricted ATS-cognizable claims to those
occurring on U.S. soil-or even to those that did not occur in the territory of another state, as Kiobel reframed the presumption-would
not provide a remedy for any number of actions that would fall within the core purposes of the ATS. These would include attacks by
U.S. persons on foreign embassies and diplomats, harms committed
by U.S. corporations against foreign nationals, or any number of other situations implicating foreign policy. Few of these actions are
likely to occur on the high seas. They will instead most likely occur
in the United States or in the territory of a foreign state.
Ironically, then, applying a presumption against extraterritoriality is in tension with the statutory purpose, even if one's goal is to
construe the statute in a manner that will "protect against unintended
38. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
39. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491).
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clashes" between U.S. and foreign law and "avoid international discord" and "[t]he danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the
conduct of foreign policy. "' 40 Application of a presumption against
extraterritorially instead would hobble the ATS and prevent it from
achieving precisely those goals with respect to conduct committed
outside the United States. In this sense, it is the construction imposed
by the Kiobel majority that could constitute "unwarranted judicial interference."
Under the more universalist view of the ATS-which is the
41
only reading that fully captures the statute's application to piracy strict application of the canon against extraterritoriality makes even
less sense. The application of the ATS to piracy raises serious questions why, if the statute applied to conduct subject to universal jurisdiction in 1789, it should not also apply to conduct that is equally
subject to universal jurisdiction in 2013, such as genocide, torture,
and war crimes. Some commentators, and the Kiobel majority, attempt to portray piracy as unique even among universal jurisdiction
crimes, because piracy is committed outside the territory of any state
and thus is less likely to provoke conflict with a foreign state. But
this distinction is overblown, as Justice Breyer demonstrates. 42 Acts
of piracy patently fall under the jurisdiction of the sovereign state
whose ship is attacked, as well as the state whose nationals are
harmed. Under any ordinary conception of jurisdiction, those would
be the states with authority to adjudicate and punish. Universal jurisdiction simply expands that authority to other states, which have no
other jurisdictional nexus to the violation. And that same dynamic is
true of any harm that is subject to universal jurisdiction today-some
states will possess primary jurisdiction based on a direct nexus to
their territory or their nationals, but as a matter of international law,
any state may punish.
However, the canon against extraterritoriality does not apply,
in toto, to the ATS, and the various opinions suggest that there is
room for adapting the "principles underlying" the canon so as to preserve most of the core purposes of the ATS. The critical question,
then, is how robustly those principles should be understood to operate in the ATS context, and how to read the "touch and concern"
standard articulated by the Chief Justice for rebutting the operation of
40. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)); id. (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Recognizing that Congress enacted the ATS
to permit recovery of damages from pirates and others who violated basic international law
norms..., Sosa essentially leads today's judges to ask: Who are today's pirates?").
42. Id. at 1672-73.
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those principles.
III. THE "TOUCH AND CONCERN" TEST
Returning now to that final paragraph of the majority opinion,
we again ask what that test requires. For example, how much does
rebutting the "Kiobel presumption" depend on conduct that actually
touches and concerns the "territory" of the United States, and how
much does it instead concern the underlying purposes of the presumption that the Court identifies-purposes that to some extent
dovetail with the motivating purposes behind the ATS, including not
provoking conflict with foreign interests? The majority does refer to
touching and concerning "the territory" of the United States, but the
conditions that could satisfy this are quite broad.
Conduct and harm can interact with territory in a wide variety
of ways. Actions may be taken inside a territory, with the impact also felt inside. Actions may be taken inside a territory, with the impact outside the territory. 43 Actions may be taken outside a territory,
but the effects felt inside the territory (giving rise to the concept of
"effects jurisdiction"). Actions and impacts may be multifarious and
mixed, with actions taken both inside and outside a territory, and the
impact felt both inside and outside as well. Finally, actions may be
taken outside a territory, with the impact also outside the territory.
The latter was the situation in Kiobel, and it is the only one of these
situations in which the conduct or impact would not touch and concern the territory of the United States. 44 The complexity of the interface between territory and actions can be exacerbated further if the
actors are multinational corporations, for which relevant decisions
and actions may be taken, and injuries occur, in multiple places. In
any of these scenarios, if some aspect of the relevant conduct or harm
occurs in the United States, the action could touch and concern the
United States.

43. It is also well established that a state can be responsible under international law for
acts occurring in its own territory that exposed an individual to harmful acts abroad. See,
e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (finding the United
Kingdom would be responsible for extraditing an individual to death row in the United
States).
44. U.S. domestic tort law recognizes that conduct giving rise to an injury may occur
in multiple locations. For example, a product may be manufactured in place A, incorporated
into another product in place B, and cause injury in place C. Depending on the law of the
jurisdiction, the "tort" may be understood to have occurred in all three places, not just in the
final location of the injury. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator, 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
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Furthermore, the opinion states that it is "the claim" that
must touch and concern the United States, not "the conduct." In
other words, the concerns underlying the presumption would allow
for considerations not limited to the locus of conduct.45 This broader
phrasing suggests that a suit may successfully rebut the Kiobel presumption if some aspect of the claim has significant implications for,
or relationship to, the United States, even if the actual conduct giving
rise to the violation occurs elsewhere. In particular, events occurring
abroad that affect the national interests of the United States could
well be understood to "touch and concern" the United States sufficiently to rebut the presumption. Examples would include conduct
by U.S. persons abroad, whose conduct the United States has legal
authority to regulate under international law principles of nationality
jurisdiction. 46 Under this principle, although mere corporate presence was not enough in Kiobel, domicile or nationality of a corporation or an individual could be sufficient. Likewise, an object of important U.S. interests abroad, such as an embassy or military base,
could qualify, such that an attack on an embassy that resulted in the
deaths of embassy employees who were foreign nationals could also
touch and concern the United States. Kiobel leaves all of these situations still on the table.
A rigid application of the canon against extraterritoriality
might be understood to require that some, or all, of the conduct giving rise to a violation must "touch and concern" the territory of the
United States. This appears to be the preferred reading of Justices
Alito and Thomas, who express frustration in their concurrence that
the majority opinion "leaves much unanswered." ' 47 They would
have applied a definitive territorial bar to the scope of the ATS, holding that an ATS claim would be barred by the presumption against
extraterritoriality "unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate
an internationallaw norm that satisfies Sosa's requirements of defi-

45. This aspect of Kiobel is also consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison, which detached the presumption against extraterritoriality from the location of the
conduct. The fraud alleged in Morrison occurred in the United States, but the Court
nevertheless applied the presumption because it found that the focus of the Securities
Exchange Act was on the location of the transaction affected by the fraud. See William S.
Dodge, Morrison's Effects Test, 40 Sw. L. REv. 687, 690-91 (2011).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(2) (1987) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to... the activities..
of its nationals wherever located."); cf Lubbe v. Cape plc, [1998] CLC 1559 (C.A.), aff'd
[2000] 1 WLR 1545 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (suit against U.K. parent corporation in
United Kingdom on behalf of South African asbestos workers).
47.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring).
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niteness and acceptance among civilized nations." 48 In other words,
these two Justices apparently would have required that all the elements of a violation of an international law norm that is actionable
under the ATS must have been satisfied inside the United States in
order for the claim to be actionable under the ATS. The relevant
conduct as well as the injury would have to occur in the United
States. This would be an extremely high territorial bar. Indeed, this
standard seemingly would exclude even piracy or any other claims
arising on the high seas-and thus is inconsistent with the majority
opinion that Justices Alito and Thomas joined.
This territorially restricted reading clearly did not obtain a
majority, however. That fact, and the reasoning of the other two
concurring opinions, suggest that there may be significant flexibility
in the circumstances that would "touch and concern" the United
States sufficiently to rebut the Kiobel presumption.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, in particular, makes clear that he
believes some scope for extraterritorial application of the ATS remains. He observes that the majority opinion "is careful to leave
open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation" of the ATS. 49 He notes that "[m]any serious concerns
with respect to human rights abuses committed abroadhave been addressed" by the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which establishes an express cause of action for extraterritorial acts of torture and
extrajudicial killing.5 0 He further observes that
other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the
reasoning and holding of today's case; and in those
disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation. 51
Thus, Justice Kennedy does not consider the door to be closed to
ATS cases arising abroad. His references to "human rights abuses
committed abroad" and to the TVPA, which limits civil damages actions to violations committed under the authority or color of law of
"any foreign nation," suggest that he believes that claims that "touch
and concern" the United States adequately to rebut the Kiobel presumption may include, in some circumstances, claims involving
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1670 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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gross human rights violations committed by foreign nationals, against
foreign nationals, on foreign soil so long as they have some greater
nexus to the United States than the facts of Kiobel.
Justice Breyer's concurrence with Justices Ginsburg, Kagan,
and Sotomayor suggests an alternative potential reading for the
"touch and concern" test. Justice Breyer would not have relied on a
presumption against extraterritoriality at all, which he found inappropriate for the ATS. Nevertheless, he offers a broader rationale for
when a claim might sufficiently "touch and concern" the United
States for the "presumption against extraterritoriality [to] be 'overcome." 52 Invoking the purposes of the ATS, Justice Breyer identifies three circumstances that, in his view, would adequately implicate
U.S. interests to rebut the Kiobel presumption:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United
States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as
well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.5 3
These three categories, Justice Breyer indicates, are designed
to honor the underlying purposes of the ATS of advancing U.S. national interests by punishing violations that could cause friction with
other states or offend universal norms (such as piracy), while still
constraining the statute sufficiently to avoid foreign policy conflicts
or running afoul of international law. Justice Breyer's first category,
based on territoriality jurisdiction under international law, is uncontroversial and consistent with the views of other members of the
Court. His second category, where the offender is a U.S. national,
captures the core purpose of the ATS that a rigid approach to extraterritoriality would cut off. As discussed above, offenses committed
by U.S. citizens against foreign nationals (who are the only valid
plaintiffs under the ATS) would fall squarely within the state responsibility view of the purposes of the ATS. Such actions clearly implicate U.S. interests and could provoke friction with foreign states.
Principles of nationality jurisdiction under international law also
clearly recognize the authority of the United States to prescribe and
punish such conduct regardless where it occurs. Justice Breyer's
reading of nationality jurisdiction as sufficiently "touching and con52.
53.

Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1674.
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ceming" the United States to rebut the Kiobel presumption thus
would remedy the distortive effect that a more restrictive approach to
extraterritoriality would have on one of the core purposes of the ATS.
The most interesting and likely most controversial of Justice
Breyer's categories that would "touch and concern" the United
States is the third, which might be called the Filartigacategory. This
category captures conduct by a defendant that "substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest," including
"preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor" for a
"common enemy of mankind." The third category captures the traditional violation of piracy, recognizing the significant national interest that the United States (and all states) has in punishing that conduct, regardless where it occurs. Although the piracy example could
suggest that the United States also has an "important national interest" in punishing any conduct that constitutes a universal jurisdiction
crime, regardless where it occurs, Justice Breyer's category at a minimum would capture such persons who later remain in the United
States for a sufficient period to suggest that the country is a safe harbor. The paradigmatic example of such a case, of course, was
Filartiga,where the torturer later came to the United States, and remained nine months while overstaying a tourist visa. Justice Kennedy had suggested an interest in preserving the Filartigaprecedent in
the first Kiobel oral argument,5 4 and his brief concurrence can be understood as holding open that possibility. Justice Breyer's opinion
more explicitly provides a theory and rationale for fitting the Filartiga precedent within the touch and concern framework. What is not
clear, however, is how long individuals must stay in the United States
in order to give rise to the impression of harboring. Must they be
permanent residents, as in Samantar?55 Or have merely overstayed a
visa, as in Filartiga?56 Or simply be present outside the U.N. headquarters district, as in Kadic?57
Interestingly, the three categories that Justice Breyer would
find adequate to satisfy the majority's "touch and concern" test echo
the circumstances under which the U.S. government urged the Su54. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 101491).
55. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012) (ATS suit alleging harms
committed in Somalia by a Somali national who later became a U.S. legal permanent
resident), petitionfor cert.filed (No. 11-1479).
56. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995) (ATS suit alleging violations
in former Yugoslavia by Serbian national who was served outside the Headquarters District
in New York while visiting the United States for a U.N. meeting).
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preme Court to preserve the possibility of ATS jurisdiction. In its
second amicus brief to the Court, the United States observed that "allowing suits based on conduct occurring in a foreign country in the
circumstances presented in Filartigais consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States." ' 58 The United States articulated a state responsibility view of the purposes of the statute, urging
the Court to be guided by the statute's "legislative purpose to permit
a tort remedy.., for law of nations violations for which the ag59
grieved foreign nation could hold the United States accountable."
The government asked the Court not to "resolve across the board"
the circumstances under which an ATS cause of action could address
conduct occurring abroad. 60 It underscored that "there are circumstances in which a court may recognize a federal common law cause
of action based on the ATS for extraterritorial violations of the law of
nations," ' 61 and warned in particular that "the Court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing any such application of the
ATS." 62 This included Filartiga,which the United States portrayed
as arising "in circumstances that could give rise to the prospect that
this country would be perceived as harboring the perpetrator." 63 The
government pointed to the TVPA's cause of action that now addresses the situation in Filartiga,and stated that "[o]ther claims based on
be considered in light of the circonduct in a foreign country should
64
cumstances in which they arise."
The government also acknowledged that piracy was a "paradigmatic tort[]" that the First Congress would have recognized as an
actionable violation of the law of nations, 65 and pointed to the 1795
Bradford opinion and other sources for the proposition that "the circumstances in which a cause of action in a U.S. court might have
been deemed appropriate to adjudicate an action alleging that a person violated the law of nations ... would not necessarily have been

limited exclusively to conduct occurring in U.S. territory."' 66 By
contrast, under the circumstances in Kiobel, the government suggested the United States could not be thought responsible in the eyes of
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

U.S. Amicus II, supra note 6, at 4-5, 13.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at6.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at6.
Id. at 9.
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the international community for affording a remedy for the company's actions, while the nations directly concerned could. 67 This
overall approach, the government urged, was consistent with the predominant purpose of the ATS to "avoid[], not provok[e], conflicts
with other nations." 68 The government urged that:
[t]he Court need not decide whether a cause of action
should be created in other circumstances, such as
where the defendant is a U.S. national or corporation,
or where the alleged conduct of the foreign sovereign
occurred outside its territory, or where conduct by
69
others occurred within the U.S. or on the high seas.
In short, the government's position supports a reading of the
various Kiobel opinions that would cabin the presumption against extraterritoriality to the underlying principles of avoiding conflict with
foreign states. It would preserve flexibility to recognize that extraterritorial claims that "touch and concern" the United States sufficiently to displace the Kiobel presumption can and should include claims
involving: conduct in the United States, perpetrators who are nationals or domiciled in the United States, and other implications of U.S.
national interests, including piracy and the United States' important
interest in denying safe haven. Early returns suggest that this, broadly speaking, is in fact how a number of courts are reading the Kiobel
presumption and the grounds for its rebuttal. 70

67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 16 (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
69. Id. at21.
70. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, No. 99-125 (JMF), 2013 WL 2325266, at *4
(D.D.C. May 29, 2013) (finding that ATS claims by Kenyan victims against Osama Bin
Laden and Al Qaeda for the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, which was plotted in
part within the United States, "'touched and concerned' the United States with 'sufficient
force' to displace the presumption"); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2: 10-cv-00342, slip op. at 2, 7
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (report and recommendation) (holding that the Somali
defendant's permanent residence in the United States rebuts the Kiobel presumption for ATS
claims involving human rights violations against a Somali national in Somalia, and awarding
damages); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756,
at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013) (upholding ATS claims by Ugandan NGO alleging antiLGBT activity in the United States and Uganda, and concluding that the Kiobel presumption
does not apply "where Defendant is a citizen of the United States and where his offensive
conduct is alleged to have occurred, in substantial part, within this country"). But see,
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, No. 09-2778-cv(L), slip op. at 2, 4 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2013)
(dismissing claims against U.S. and German companies for apartheid-era crimes in South
Africa and mischaracterizing Kiobel as holding "unambiguous[ly]" that "federal courts may
not, under the ATS, recognize common-law causes of action for conduct occurring in the
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CONCLUSION

To be sure, the various opinions in Kiobel are not a model of
clarity, and confusion over their import is likely to prevail for some
time. Careful consideration of the various opinions in the case, however, indicates that, as in Sosa, while the most sweeping universalist
application of the ATS has no doubt been trimmed, the door to some
extraterritorial ATS claims remains ajar. The reading of the Kiobel
majority that is most consistent with the opinion of Justice Kennedy,
the interests of the United States articulated by the government, and
broadly accepted purposes of the ATS should preserve its ability to
continue advancing, to some extent, Filartiga'spromise of a borderless regime of accountability as a matter of last resort for egregious
human rights violators.

territory of another sovereign"), reh 'g en banc denied; Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., No.
09-1335, slip op. at 1, 8 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013) (dismissing ATS claims against a U.S.
company for human rights violations in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq on the grounds that "the
acts giving rise to their tort claims occurred exclusively in Iraq," and misreading Kiobel as
holding that "the presumption against extraterritoriality is only rebuttable by legislative
act").

